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Abstract. 
 
In 2003 India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) formalised a dialogue forum regarding shared 
international political concerns, including democracy, personal freedom and human rights. By 
doing so they created a new global justice discourse shedding light on the North South divide. 
Since its creation IBSA has gained greater influence in the global political order by increasing 
their presence in global institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and the United 
Nations. Acknowledging the difficulty of being accepted in large institutional councils (e.g. 
the UNSC) they have opted for a subtler approach and created diplomacy networks and steering 
committees. IBSA uses a soft power governance method known as orchestration to follow up 
on their founding document, the Brasilia Declaration. The IBSA initiative has sparked a new 
voice from the South which is challenging the current western dominance in international 
politics. The IBSA initiative aims to change the current course of international politics through 
international institutions. This article will delve into the method of orchestration and how IBSA 
uses it. This thesis will look at how IBSA uses orchestration theory to reach their goals.  
 
Introduction. 
 
The birth of the India, Brazil, South-Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum created new opportunities 
for middle powers in the Global South to voice their concerns about the global political system. 
The IBSA forum is based on the shared values of the three countries stemming from similar 
development situations. ‘Its creation recognised the necessity of a process of dialogue among 
developing nations and countries of the South to counter their marginalisation’ (IBSA). All 
three countries have traditionally been on the margins of North-defined international 
institutions and have been closely involved with third world nationalism (Vieira et. al., 509-
510; 2011). However, they do respect the existing international order, as the Brasilia 
declaration states: “Respecting the rule of international law, strengthening the United Nations 
and the Security Council and prioritizing the exercise of diplomacy as means to maintain 
international peace and security” (Flemes, 402; 2009). An important part of the IBSA strategy 
is gaining influence on an international level through diplomacy and participation in 
international institutions. Through joining steering committees rather than aiming for top-
decision making committees, IBSA aims to incorporate its values in the international system 
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in a multilateral way. “The principles, norms and values underpinning the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum are participatory democracy, respect for human rights, the Rule of Law and the 
strengthening of multilateralism” (IBSA). These values are largely based on the concerns of 
the global South relating to the North-South divide and the unfair balance of power in the 
international system. The middle power status which the three member countries enjoy, allows 
them to present themselves as representatives for other developing countries in the global 
south.  
 These ambitions in the global political system do not come easily. The IBSA forum has 
been struggling with obtaining international legitimacy, competition from other international 
coalitions (namely BRICS) and differences within the forum. The end goal is to change the 
current hegemony in the international system portrayed by the EU and the US. The forum aims 
to do this through soft- and institutional balancing strategies. In this, orchestration is used as 
the main form of global governance. Due to the financial crisis, which has affected the US and 
EU in much more intense ways than the IBSA member states, the global south has been able 
to develop from a third world status towards a global South. In this regard, its economic weight 
can prove to be of great importance in changing the global status quo. This thesis aims to 
investigate how IBSA uses orchestration theory to reach the goals it set out for itself in 2003. 
These goals include reform of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, and 
economic, social and environmental development. Ultimately these goals are drawn up in 
service of creating a greater voice for the Global South and moving influence away from the 
Northern hegemons (i.e. the US and EU) and towards the developing countries in the South. 
IBSA uses soft power and diplomatic bargaining as their main instruments to achieve their 
goals. Orchestration is an important mechanism in their strategies but is no panacea. This thesis 
will answer the following question: can IBSA create sustainable change in International 
Politics by using orchestration as main governance form, in order to increase the influence 
enjoyed by the Global South? This thesis will argue that IBSA has successfully implemented 
orchestration theory in a number of the issue areas stated in the Brasilia Declaration, mainly 
social equity, social inclusion and economic development. However, orchestration is less 
effective in shifting attention from the Global North towards the Global South, since UN reform 
is traditionally done by states and groups of states. Orchestration can be useful in creating 
leverage in intergovernmental negotiations in the United Nations. The thesis will be structured 
as follows: in chapter one a clear overview of the recent academic debate surrounding IBSA 
will be provided. Several scholars provide a different view as to whether IBSA is (still) 
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relevant. Chapter two will provide theoretical background and methodology. IBSA is rooted in 
institutionalism and multilateralism and relies on soft power. Orchestration theory will be 
broadly discussed in chapter two as it is the main form of governance used by IBSA. In chapter 
three the IBSA forum will be explained and contextualised. Its main ‘competitor’ BRICS will 
be explained and a case study between two financial development programs initiated by both 
dialogue forums will reveal the different relevance of both BRICS and IBSA. Chapter four will 
delve into the use of orchestration by IBSA, how the three countries are using it now and where 
it can be of importance in the future, mainly regarding the reform of the UNSC. Finally, some 
concluding remarks will be provided. 
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Chapter 1 - Literature Review. 
 
The IBSA dialogue forum celebrated its 10-year anniversary in 2013. During its existence it 
has been a widely discussed subject in International Relations. This discussion ranges from the 
economic relevance of IBSA (Masters et. al.: 2015, Argawal: 2010, Taylor: 2009) to the 
regional impact IBSA has (Vieira et al., 2011, Rodrigues, 2016). Many aspects discussed by 
International Relations scholars are relevant to the goals IBSA ultimately wants to reach. 
Economic relevance relates to the soft power strategy the IBSA countries undertake, the BRICS 
take into question the legitimacy and relevance of the IBSA forum whilst simultaneously 
creating room for the expansion of the IBSA forum. In the following section a brief overview 
of the discussion on the IBSA forum in International Relations today is provided. 
In 2008 the world had to deal with a financial crisis. In this, the Global North suffered 
far more gravely than the Global South1. It was in this period that developing countries had the 
upper hand in the global financial market and developed their domestic economies to include 
a bigger middle class. Developing countries in the South and East were able to fill up the gaps 
in the world economy that were previously filled by the West before the crisis. Today, then, 
the middle class in developing countries is developing so quickly that it is far more interesting 
to focus on them, than for example the United States. Cross-regional cooperation, such as the 
IBSA forum, play an important role in this changing economic world order. Developing 
countries, and economic relations between them are increasingly shaping the global financial 
market and shifting away hegemony from traditional Western hegemons (Pieterse et al., 25-
26; 2011). The rise of emerging societies marks a turn in globalisation and can ultimately lead 
to an emancipatory multipolarity. The question remains, however, whether these countries are 
merely joining the club, or are actually changing the world order.  
Some authors argue that developing countries are indeed pushing for global reform in 
which the voice of the South is represented more equally (Pieterse et al. 2011; Flemes, 2009; 
Gray et al., 2016). The newly obtained position in the world order is used to reform institutions 
of global governance and increase development aid. The IBSA member states have pushed for 
the advancement of the Doha development round in order to prevent the reinforcement of 
Northern capacity to extract concessions from the weaker states in the South (Gray et al., 560; 
                                                          
1 The term “South” or “Global South” refers to developing countries, which are located primarily in the 
Southern Hemisphere (UNDP definition). Consequently, the Global North are developed countries situated in 
the Northern Hemisphere. 
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2016). Furthermore, Southern countries are increasingly offering aid to developing countries 
which is changing the traditional North -South aid architecture. This also increased the 
influence the global South enjoys (Gray et al., 563; 2016).  
Others argue that, even though developing countries are gaining increasing weight in 
the global order, it is far too early to argue that a New International Economic Order (NIEO)2  
is being developed. The IBSA forum is continuing a trend which can be seen from 1945 
onward: a gradual self-assertion to the world stage by the south. However, this does not 
necessarily mean the Global South is changing the world order and pushing for a NIEO. Taylor 
rightly points out the existing problems in the IBSA initiative and argues that, although change 
can be witnessed, it is premature to point towards a NIEO. Taylor notes that unresolved 
political uncertainties within the forum will prevent it from leaving an impact. These 
ambiguities surround views on nuclear weapons, non-alignment, regional development 
programs such as South-Africa’s role in NEPAD3  and the issue of the UN security council 
seats. These uncertainties need to be addressed before IBSA can move forward (Taylor, 52; 
2009). Furthermore, creating a Southern trade geography will be less easy than one might 
presume due to the regional multilateral trade agreements (MTA) IBSA has to take into 
account. Examples are Mercosur in Latin America and SACU in Africa. These MTA’s do not 
permit members to set up free trade agreements without the benefits being extended towards 
the members of the MTA. Consequently, extending a Southern trade geography will stimulate 
regional disapproval (Taylor, 53; 2009). A third problem Taylor highlights is the focus IBSA 
lies on state centric globalisation. Globalisation is, as Taylor argues, “characterised by the 
increasing importance of non-state actors and the transnationalisation of capital, where markets 
are increasingly global and integrated, allowing an internationalised ownership of capital and 
the transit of capital in and out of any number of corporations and territories” (34; 2009). The 
IBSA members do not seem to recognize this shift and still perpetuate the illusion that state 
leaders are the most central actors, disregarding the reality that foreign and strategic policies 
need to be understood in the context of transformations in the political economy (Taylor, 54; 
2009).  
                                                          
2 The New International Economic Order of the 1970’s was a push by Southern elite fractions to establish the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The UNCTAD has at times positioned an 
alternative global vision vis-à-vis dominant global powers of that time (Taylor, 46; 2009). 
3 New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) and Omega Plan for Africa 
combined to give birth to a third initiative the New African Initiative (NAI) which then led to the establishment 
of NEPAD in 2001 (http://www.nepad.org/content/about-nepad#aboutourwork). 
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Vanaik goes even further in arguing that there is a shift in global power towards a 
quintet led by the US, directly diverting attention away from Southern development powers 
such as IBSA. The quintet is made up by the US, the EU, Russia, China and India. Its workings 
will be informal and revolve around the USA as the chief coordinator and bilateral transmitter. 
The states system must provide necessary stabilising mechanisms in order to prevent 
competition among capitals to become system threatening. Southern rising powers cannot 
contribute to stabilising the international system because they lack sufficient measure in either 
demographic, economic and/or military weight. The positive impact of India’s economic 
growth is lower than one might expect. For example, growth rates in India are a result of a 
‘boom’ in the service sector. About 60% of India’s population still depends on agriculture and 
related activities for its livelihood.  
Other authors take a middle road and argue that developing countries are indeed 
‘joining the club’ of international institutions, but are also aiming to change the nature of these 
institutions towards a more South-oriented world image. Stephen, for example, argues that the 
IBSA states have spoiling, integrating and balancing effects. In the area of trade IBSA aims to 
redistribute towards developing countries. It is unlikely, however, that “the redistributive 
aspirations of the rising regional powers are […] subsumed by hegemonic imposition” 
(Stephen, 300). This means that, although not overthrowing current hegemony, it does 
constitute balancing practices against the current, Northern, vision on international trade. 
Furthermore, Stephen argues that in the monetary area the IBSA states are not necessarily 
balancing but rather opt for intergovernmental cooperation and regulation in order to limit 
development-unfriendly instability in global finance. In that sense they are ‘joining the club’ 
to try to change its view from within. Lastly, Stephen points towards the area of security, 
arguing the IBSA states want to be integrated and co-opted within security institutions (i.e. the 
United Nations). The different standpoints IBSA takes in different areas of global governance 
show that there is a combination in active balancing and active co-optation in the global 
political order. 
From the discussion surrounding the IBSA forum it is clear that developing powers 
from the global South are working together to create change in the current global order. The 
IBSA forum is the subject of this thesis, but other forums have been vital in Southern 
development too. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa (BRICS) have held several 
summits concerning developing countries’ issues and the Group of Twenty (G20) has brought 
developing countries to the table that was once reserved for the Group of Eight (G8). In light 
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of these newly formed partnerships a discussion has formed regarding the relevance of the 
IBSA forum. On the one hand it is argued that the IBSA forum is no longer relevant because it 
has too many overlapping points with the BRICS summit (Doyaili, 2013, Kornegay 2012; 
Sidiropoulos, 2013). No doubt, IBSA has lost its spot in the spotlight since the emergence of 
BRIC, later BRICS, in 2009. This takes into question the relevance of the IBSA forum since 
all the IBSA member countries are also a member of the BRICS partnership. The addition of 
Russia and China has given BRICS more weight than IBSA will ever carry due to ‘super power’ 
statuses that are enjoyed by the two countries. This has even led to one Indian envoy taking 
into question the relevance of IBSA (Kornegay, 1; 2012). The new emphasis on BRICS has 
shifted focus away from the IBSA forum. Statements of intend by IBSA have remained 
unfulfilled and working groups in the forum have not been able to show progress, even leading 
to their reduction (Doyaili et al., 301; 2013). Some authors even note that China has brought 
South-Africa in the BRICS forum in order to demote IBSA as a multilateral organisation 
(Panda, 299; 2013). Sidiropoulos points out that IBSA is slowly losing legitimacy since “the 
efficacy of informal clubs is measured as much by their perceived legitimacy as by their 
contribution to the advancement of public goods and their impact on addressing global politico-
security, economic and development challenges. If IBSA becomes a sub-category of BRICS in 
these domains, it will be lost in the cacophony of club acronyms” (288; 2013). This does not 
necessarily mean that IBSA should dissolve; it can find several niches in which it can stand out 
as a cooperative forum. Sidiropoulos goes on to argue that IBSA can differentiate itself through 
developing a stronger caucus within BRICS, treat each body as distinct and lastly to extend its 
membership in order to escape the characterisation of being assimilated into BRICS.  
Daniel Flemes argues that, for IBSA to remain relevant, the forum should 
institutionalise. In international relations, international institutions and international 
organisations are a widely discussed subject. The Handbook of International Relations by 
Carlsnaes et al. provides an apt definition of institutions as ‘sets of rules that stipulate the ways 
in which states should cooperate and compete with each other’ (Carlsnaes et al., 328; 2013). 
International organisations are defined as ‘associations of actors, typically states’ (Ibid, 329). 
These associations have membership criteria, and membership may entail privileges as well as 
costs. International organisations can thus embody institutions, such as the United Nations. 
Flemes argues that the IBSA member states can use their economic weight in their advantage 
by institutionalising trade relations. South-South trade constitutes a large part of the overall 
world trade and is an ever expanding branch of the world economy. Institutionalising economic 
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relations will provide a market of 1.2 billion people which can lead to 400 million dollars in 
foreign trade (Flemes, 19; 2007). Furthermore, the sharing of expertise and best practices 
between the three countries can help ameliorate the issue areas the troika has settled upon. 
Managing this, however, will be more difficult than one might think. Differing degrees of 
economic internationalisation and geographical factors need to be overcome to establish 
sustainable institutions between the three member states.  
On the other hand, scholars have argued that IBSA is still relevant as a standalone forum 
because certain focus points IBSA upholds vary greatly from those of the BRICS summit. It is 
these points the IBSA forum has to focus on (Arkhangelskaya, 2011; Stuenkel, 2014). 
Arkhangelskaya has written an article comparing BRICS and IBSA and assessing whether they 
are rivals or allies. She argues that an effective dialogue between the two groupings could be 
more effective than their integration. The BRICS countries have an economic priority rather 
than the developmental, political co-operation and integration priorities IBSA has. In this 
regard the BRICS grouping and IBSA do not compete with each other, but also cannot 
substitute each other. An important difference between the IBSA forum and BRICS is their 
mode of government. All three IBSA members are multiparty democracies allowing them to 
discuss certain topics (e.g. human rights, civil society, reform implementation) which the 
BRICS summits avoids (Struenkel, 2012). Kornegay furthermore highlights IBSAMAR (IBSA 
Maritime) as IBSA’s ticket out of ‘oblivion in in the sweepstakes of geostrategic relevance’ (2; 
2012). IBSAMAR is the body of the IBSA troika which brings together the maritime fleets of 
the member countries to execute exercises. In this regard IBSA has the upper hand in the sense 
that BRICS can never replicate a similar security body. “The Indian Ocean and the South 
Atlantic represent IBSA’s comparative strategic advantage as a complementary geopolitical 
factor in the BRICS equation which neither China nor Russia can claim” (Kornegay, 1; 2012). 
The majority of the works published on the relevance of the IBSA forum focusses on the 
reinvention of IBSA. Its relevance is barely doubted, but its need to focus on reinventing its 
agenda points and values are a common feat in many articles. 
Developing the Global South towards a more active global player remains a necessary 
project. Both IBSA and BRICS are working on making an influential Global South a fact. IBSA 
uses different strategies to reach their goal than BRICS and can employ its influence in certain 
niches to remain relevant. It can actively contribute to the reform of global politics and relies 
on increasing soft power to do so. The increase in soft power stems from the use of 
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Orchestration theory by IBSA. The next section will set out on the theoretical background of 
IBSA and what orchestration theory entails. 
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Chapter 2 - Theory and methodology. 
 
In order to answer the research question posed in the section above it is first necessary to set 
out a methodology and theoretical foundation. This thesis is based on relevant academic 
literature in the field of International Relations and International Politics. Drawing on the work 
of renowned scholars such as Jönsson (2001), Keohane (1990) and Ruggie (1992) 
institutionalism and multilateralism will be discussed, in order to better understand the nature 
of the IBSA dialogue forum. To understand the strategy that IBSA takes in International 
Politics it is important to understand different notions of Power in International Relations. 
Especially Soft power, as developed by Joseph Nye (2004), is an important factor in IBSA 
strategy. Soft power is also the basis of the governance method which suits IBSA’s strategy 
best, namely: orchestration. Developed mainly as a strategy for International Organisations by 
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, orchestration uses a soft and indirect approach to 
governance. It is especially relevant to IBSA’s strategy, due to its soft nature and large potential 
in gaining international political influence. The next sections will look at the relevant theories 
surrounding IBSA to create a strong theoretical foundation. In order to substantiate the 
importance of orchestration, discourse analysis will be used. Furthermore, a case study will be 
provided which covers IBSA and BRICS (arguably IBSA’s biggest rival) and a comparison 
between the IBSA Facility for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger (IBSA fund) and the New 
Development Bank (NDB, created by the BRICS countries). The focus of this thesis is on 
IBSA, because it uses a different strategy to shift the current global order towards the Global 
South. No other international institution or organisation uses soft power and diplomacy to the 
same extend as IBSA does. It is therefore an interesting case worthy of researching in the light 
of global political change. The following section will expand on the theories relevant to IBSA. 
Chapter three will expand on IBSA itself and contrast it with the BRICS initiative. Chapter 
four will investigate to what extend IBSA is using orchestration and where it can use 
orchestration to reach the goals IBSA has set out for itself. 
In an academy which has, for a long time, been defined by realism it is rather difficult 
to create notions of institutionalism. After all, it would seem strange for a state to give up its 
sovereign power in order to co-operate with other states. In an anarchic world order, such as 
the realist tradition claims, it is not wise to agree to a set of rules, as this will negatively affect 
the power a state holds. Up until the 1970s, therefore, institutionalism remained atheoretical in 
nature. With influences from economics and political sciences, however, a broader theoretical 
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understanding of institutions came to be (Jönsson et al., 2001; 3). The notion of institution also 
changed, differentiating institutions from organisations; the former being an entity and the 
latter a set of rules (Martin et al. in Carlsnaes et al., 326; 2013). New interest in the theoretical 
side of institutions produced different approaches to the study of those institutions. As 
developed by Keohane, neoliberal institutionalism claims that ‘international relations would be 
unintelligible without some degree of institutionalization, because they would lack shared 
expectations and understandings, and that variation in the commonality, specificity, and 
autonomy of institutions will affect the constraints and incentives facing states and will 
therefore exert impacts on state behaviour in world politics’ (734; 1990). It therefore differs 
from neorealism, on which it is based, in that it denies that states constantly search for relative 
gains. On the other hand, rational choice institutionalism argues that utility-maximizing actors, 
in this case states, act out of self-interest and form central actors in the political process. 
Institutions are a product of their interdependence, strategic interaction and collective action. 
Institutions emerge and survive because they fulfil important functions for the actors involved 
(Jönsson et al., 5; 2001).  
A more cultural approach to institutionalism can be found in historical institutionalism. 
It is not per se a calculated move to engage with an institution, but rather a result of shared 
world views. Institutions therefore provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and 
action. Historical institutionalism allows for historic contingencies and focusses on path 
dependency which ultimately leads to the persistence of institutions. Closely related to 
historical institutionalism is normative institutionalism. The latter theory places attention on 
norms and values rather than historical background or self-interested strategic calculations. 
Institutions thus constrain individual choice and apply a logic of appropriateness in world 
politics. The latter is often conflicting with the logic of consequences, ultimately taking 
appropriate actions is less attractive to states than taking the actions that have the most positive 
outcome (Jönsson et al., 5-6; 2001).  
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a period of accelerated globalisation. 
With unprecedented gains in economic growth and interconnectivity also came a negative side. 
Irregular migration, the rise of international terrorism and organized crime, food and energy 
insecurity and climate change. These challenges can no longer be faced by each country 
individually and states became interdependent (Rüland, 84; 2011). This is one of the underlying 
reasons why the IBSA initiative was brought to life. A cooperation between three states which 
aim to alter the world’s political order. This cooperation can be classified as multilateralism 
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and is thus an important aspect in understanding the structure the IBSA initiative has taken. 
Multilateralism can be defined in several different ways and over the years the definition has 
changed. Robert Keohane defined it in 1990 as ‘the practice of co-ordinating national policies 
in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’ 
(731). This leaves the meaning of multilateralism to a broad spectrum of possibilities. 
Nowadays, under Keohane’s definition, almost all international relations are multilateral. 
Ruggie expands the definition after concluding that Keohane’s definition remains too nominal 
and lacks a qualitative dimension. He defines multilateralism as ‘an institutional form which 
coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of "generalized" principles of 
conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without 
regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in 
any specific occurrence’ (571; 1992). Ruggie’s definition is much more specific in that it adds 
conditions in which multilateralism must take place. It is no longer merely the co-ordination of 
national policies of three or more states because those states will have to agree on certain 
principles of conduct. These principles of conduct create a framework in which the three states 
can co-ordinate their relations and can act on certain situations knowing it is done in the best 
interest of all three countries, rather than just one. Dent expands on the definition by Ruggie 
and introduces the concept of a Multilateral Utility. ‘A multilateral utility makes proactive 
contributions to global multilateral forums “to foster stability, peace, prosperity, and equality 
in the global system”, “empowers relevant institutions at the international system” and thwarts 
actors undermining the multilateral order’ (Rüland quoting Dent, 85; 2011). 
For multilateralism to exist there must first be a certain degree of institutionalisation. 
Both Keohane and Ruggie emphasize the importance of institutions in multilateralism, for it is 
through institutions that the co-ordination is achieved and principles of conduct can be agreed 
upon. IBSA can be regarded as an international institution, regardless of the degree of formal 
institutionalisation. As pointed out above, a broad institutionalist view can allow for an 
international network to be classified as international institution, through a shared world view 
or shared norms and values. As Husar points out, IBSA can furthermore be classified as a 
multilateral utility, since it is contributing proactively to multilateral forums through ‘its 
capacity to increase the level of information, reduce transaction costs and strengthen the 
cohesion among the three members’ (Husar, 21; 2016). Within the scope of multilateralism, 
several authors have referred to the IBSA partnership as trilateralist. In the latter, the three 
member states put their own advancement before South-South solidarity. The two, 
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multilateralism and trilateralism, do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive, as Graham 
points out. ‘IBSA is a trilateral forum within a multilateral system and also fits well with the 
concept of shallow multilateralism’ (Graham, 412; 2011). In this, shallow multilateralism must 
be understood as commitment up to providing aid, information and consultation, but no 
‘deeper’ commitment than that. Trilateralism, in the case of IBSA, can be combined with 
multilateralism because many of the issues that concern IBSA are shared by all three countries. 
This means that by acting in common, the three member states also act out of self-interest. By 
creating a multilateral alliance with countries that have similar international interest, 
developing countries are able to increase their visibility, voice and decision making-power 
through institutions. 
Having established what IBSA is engaged in, it is now wise to look into different 
theories of how such partnerships can project power and reach the goals that have been set out. 
A major topic in International Relations is the concept of Power. It is at the heart of IR because 
it determines whether a state, or group of states, will have their desires fulfilled. An 
international institution, a multilateral cooperation or a trilateral partnership are all forms of 
constraining power or collectivising power in order to balance against a state with more power. 
In the case of IBSA, the concept of soft power is most important. 
Joseph Nye, developed the notion of ‘soft power’. ‘This soft power – getting others to 
want the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them’ (Nye, 5; 2004). This 
means that countries can gain power over other countries not only by military or economic 
might, but also by active involvement in institutions, a projection of norms and values and 
development aid and peacekeeping. However, soft power is different than influence. Influence 
can also have its roots in hard power mechanisms such as threats or payments. Soft power, on 
the other hand, is attractive power and its resources are those that produce attraction. Soft power 
is thus an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the 
achievement of those values (Nye, 7; 2004). It seems abundant to state that the three member 
states of the IBSA forum share the same values and recognize the duty to contribute to those 
values. The question is not whether the three states share those values, but how they attract the 
rest of the world to share those values and, consequently, increase their soft power. With soft 
power as a strategy, the IBSA forum engages with world politics in order to increase the voice 
of the global south. The main form of governance for IBSA is soft power, which can best be 
explained by the theory of orchestration. In international governance there are several theories 
on how international institutions and international organisations (IOs) can operate. Abbott et 
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al. aptly define four types of governance modes which help to understand the importance of 
orchestration, first as a mode of governance in general and, later, as form of governance for 
IOs. The latter is important to understand the use of orchestration for an international institution 
such as IBSA. 
 Firstly, Abbott et al. describe a hard and direct form: hierarchy. In hierarchy the state 
promulgates mandatory, enforceable rules which apply directly to the target actors. These rules 
are backed by the state’s monopoly of legitimate physical violence. These rules directly apply 
to the targeted agents, which makes hierarchy both a hard and direct form of governance (8, 
2015). Secondly, Abbott et al. describe delegation, a form of governance which is hard, but 
indirect. Target agents are addressed indirectly, because the governor uses a third party to 
enforce rules or manage policy. It remains a hard form of governance, however, because the 
governor has formal legal control over the third party to which it delegated its tasks (9; 2015). 
The third mode of governance described is collaboration. This concerns a governance mode 
which is soft and at the same time direct. It uses ideational and material inducements instead 
of obligation and coercion to reach target agents. States and other governors collaborate with 
target agents to promote self-regulation rather than top-down state regulations. This, then, 
requires target actors to voluntarily abide by regulation, making it a soft form of governance. 
It is a direct form of governance, because no third party is used by the governor to address its 
targets (Ibid.). Lastly, states engage in a form of governance which is both soft and indirect: 
orchestration. Abbott et al. define it as follows: ‘Orchestration is a mode of governance in 
which one actor (the orchestrator) enlists one or more intermediary actors (the intermediaries) 
to govern a third actor or set of actors (the targets) in line with the orchestrator’s goals’ (224, 
2015). Orchestration is an indirect governance strategy because it uses intermediaries to govern 
targets. The governor does not firmly control its intermediaries and must therefore enlist their 
voluntary cooperation, making it a soft form of governance (10, 2015).  
It must be noted that, in practice, these forms of governance are not as clear cut as they 
appear here. There are forms of ‘(in)directness’ and ‘hardness’. This is to say that the hard-soft 
and direct-indirect categories should be ‘regarded as the extreme points of continua’ (Ibid.). 
Collaboration, for instance, might slowly evolve into orchestration when governments promote 
the creation of professional associations which can act as middlemen between government and 
target. Furthermore, orchestration may lead to delegation, when orchestrators gain stronger 
control over intermediaries. Forms of ideational support can ultimately be the only reason for 
an intermediary to exist, granting the government more control than the private states of an 
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intermediary would originally have suggested. Having set out the general scope of forms of 
governance, it is wise to put them in an international scope. 
Internationally, many trans-border problems must be solved through collective action.  
Multiple actors can benefit from collective action, unfortunately it often proves difficult to 
come to an arrangement or, once made, to stick to the arrangement. Two forms of governance 
can, then, offer a solution. The first is hierarchical in nature (resembled above by the two hard 
forms of governance: hierarchy and delegation), where one state has enough power to impose 
a solution. In a hierarchical situation, as it remains international politics, participation in an 
initiative remains voluntary. However, transnational governance can sometimes be established 
in a hierarchical manner. Examples are delegation from states to IOs or to private ‘global 
governors’ (Hale, 63; 2015). The second is a horizontal solution (represented above by the two 
soft forms of governance: collaboration and orchestration). In a horizontal solution ‘actors must 
[…] strive to find a cooperative solution, bargaining with each other and establishing 
governance mechanisms that can resolve the issue’ (Hale, 62; 2013). This also includes 
entrepreneurial governance (i.e. collaboration of firms and NGOs to set and enforce standards) 
and sub-state bottom-up transnational governance (i.e. elements of national bureaucracies and 
local/regional governments cooperating with peers across borders).   
Orchestration is, then, a form of horizontal governance often used by IOs and states. 
Orchestration is of particular value to IOs, because pursuing hard and direct modes of 
governance is relatively more difficult for IOs than, for instance, states. IOs do not have the 
same capacity to enforce the rules they set. IOs do not have authority to govern states 
hierarchically through binding international law and are constrained by states jealous of IO 
intervention in domestic governance. Orchestration can help IOs in two ways: it can ‘manage 
states’ and it can ‘bypass states’. The first can be achieved by ‘enlisting intermediaries to shape 
state preferences, beliefs and behaviour in ways that enhance state consent to and compliance 
with [IO] goals, policies and rules’ (Abbott et al., 11; 2015). This way, IOs can move away 
from their status as agents controlled by state principals, towards guiding the behaviour of 
states through intermediaries. Bypassing states can be attained by ‘enlisting intermediaries to 
influence the conduct of private actors, or to supply public goods to private targets, without 
state intermediation’ (Ibid.). This way, IOs reduce their impingement on domestic authority 
and create a domestic base of support through their intermediaries, reducing the likelihood of 
states blocking them (Abbott et al., 12;2015). Orchestration, however, is not reserved for IOs 
alone. States also make use of the governance strategy in international politics. When a 
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collective action problem regarding the initiation or operation of a governance program is 
difficult for transnational actors to solve alone, a public actor can assist in the process by using 
its sphere of influence in the private sector (Hale, 64; 2015). These public actors can be 
(sub)state and non-state actors such as ministries, public authorities, civil society, cities, private 
actors, et cetera (Klingebiel, 3; 2015).   
IOs and states can draw upon a wide range of intermediaries. The most likely 
intermediaries are NGOs and other civil society organisations, because they can be located 
according to shared goals and similar substantive agendas. Furthermore, they often control key 
governance resources and are often viewed by governments as less threatening and intrusive 
than IOs. Trans-governmental networks are also a viable intermediary. Such networks have the 
ability to manage or bypass the upper political echelons of national governments. A third 
intermediary option is business organisations. Although often the target of orchestration, they 
can be used as intermediaries for their great resources, independence from national regulators 
and, their lack of fear of political repercussions due to their market actor status. Transnational 
partnerships also act as intermediaries, both public-private and private-private. The formation 
of partnerships is often encouraged by IOs to advance more effective, results-oriented 
implementations of their agendas. Lastly, international organisations themselves can be 
intermediaries. For example the World Health Organisation (WHO) which uses UNICEF as an 
intermediary (Abbott et al., 12-14; 2015).  
In orchestration material and ideational support are most important in reaching desired 
goals. It is a soft approach and intermediaries must participate on a voluntary basis. In order to 
guarantee the support and participation of intermediaries an orchestrator can implement several 
techniques. IOs often have a large network within government domains which they can use to 
empower actors and organisation. This convening power sometimes results in the creation of 
new intermediaries.  In addition, agenda setting can mobilise potential intermediaries. IO 
agenda setting can provide cognitive and normative guidance which can influence 
intermediaries’ priorities and strategy. It can also steer donors into prioritising spending on 
intermediaries. A more straightforward technique is assistance in the form of material support 
such as finance or administrative resources. The same goes for endorsement, a relatively 
simple, yet effective, technique. By endorsing intermediaries, IOs and states can legitimize 
them and can formally recognize their activities. Lastly, coordination is an important technique, 
as it can increase the impact of intermediaries. Synchronizing activities can enhance the 
effectiveness of intermediaries (Abbott et al., 14-16; 2015). 
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IBSA is a multilateral institution consisting of three different states. This is a structure 
that is rarely discussed in orchestration theory. It does lend itself to orchestration as it shares 
many of its traits. IBSA must use soft power to increase its influence in global politics and in 
order to increase their share of soft power, orchestration is a viable strategy. Since orchestration 
itself uses a soft governance approach and uses intermediaries to reach targets, IBSA can vastly 
expand its network of influence in international politics by expanding cooperation with 
intermediaries. It has readily available the techniques which promote support and participation 
of these intermediaries. In the case of IBSA, the target would be the UN general assembly 
member states and, more specifically, the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). They, ultimately, control the level of influence the Global South has and 
control the reform of the UNSC. How IBSA operates, what they have achieved, where their 
main competition comes from, how IBSA uses orchestration at the moment and how it can 
ameliorate in the future will be set out in the next two sections. 
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Chapter 3 - Putting IBSA in perspective. 
 
South-South cooperation. 
On 6 June 2003 the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Celso Amorim and Yashwant Sinhathree, 
respectively the three Foreign Minsiters from South-Africa, Brazil and India, came together 
after trilateral talks during the 29th G8 summit in Evian, France. The purpose for the meeting 
was to formalize a new trilateral developmental initiative between the three states. During the 
meeting the Brasilia declaration was created, which marked the official start of what is known 
as the IBSA dialogue forum. It is the product of the shared views of all three states on 
influencing change in the global political economy and the promotion of South-South 
cooperation (Graham, 414; 2011). The creation of IBSA and BRICS lies in a broader South-
South cooperation history. The United Nations office for South-South cooperation (UNOSSC) 
defines it as: 
‘a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains. Involving two or 
more developing countries, it can take place on a bilateral, regional, sub regional or 
interregional basis. Developing countries share knowledge, skills, expertise and 
resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts’ (UNDP). 
 
South-South cooperation began with the Bandung conference in 1955 which founded the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) (da Silva et al., 172; 2016). In 1964 the group of 77 (G77) became 
the largest coalition of developing countries within the United Nations. This led to the creation 
of the UNOSSC in 1974 (UNDP). More recently, however, South-South cooperation became 
more important in the light of economic development. Emerging economies formed small 
developing country groups, such as the G8, that ‘identified themselves as defenders of the 
objectives and interests of the South’ (da Silva et al., 175; 2016). However, the post-Cold War 
uncertainty that marked the 1990s caused a significant loss of momentum in South-South 
cooperation. Not until 2003, with the creation of the G20+ and IBSA, was the southern cause 
reinvigorated. 
IBSA 
The IBSA initiative was a new approach, different from the traditionally large groups of 
countries. In the words of Foreign Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim: 
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“Having gone through, in my previous experience as a diplomat and foreign minister, 
so many failed attempts of establishing such groups, but still recognizing the validity 
of my colleague’s (and, later on, also my friend’s) concern, I suggested we should try 
something relatively simple: a small group – only three countries – one in each 
continent of the South, all of them vibrant multi-ethnic, multicultural democracies, with 
an ever-increasing role in the world: India, South Africa and Brazil. Thus the idea of 
creating what came to be known as IBSA was born.” (231; 2010) 
 
The Brasilia declaration of 2003 stated the special consideration by all three states for 
International Law, the strengthening of the UN and exercising diplomacy as the main way to 
achieve international peace and security. The main concerns stated in the declaration are the 
need to reform the UN, especially the Security Council, the new threats to security – such as, 
but not limited to: terrorism, transnational organized crimes and threats to public health – and 
the need for promotion of social equity and inclusion. On an economic note, the declaration 
states the intend to promote social and economic development through greater cooperation 
among their countries and recognize the need to reform the Global Political Economy through, 
inter alia, completing the Doha round of negotiations. Furthermore, the Rio Conference and 
its Agenda 21, the Millennium Summit and the Monterrey and Johannesburg Summits, and the 
Program for the Implementation of Agenda 21 are mentioned in the declaration and are 
emphasized upon, in that they ‘contain fundamental guidelines to orient the action of their 
governments and cooperation initiatives’ (Brasilia Declaration, 2003). In 2006 the first IBSA 
summit was held during which the Brasilia Declaration was signed by the three countries’ 
prime ministers. 
Since 2003 the IBSA dialogue forum has developed into concrete measures taken in 
international politics. Politically, IBSA has seen successful cooperation on TRIPS (Trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights) and access to medicine. Furthermore, IBSA has 
successfully coordinated ‘the founding, maintenance and even leadership of the G20+ in the 
run-up to the WTO negotiations in Cancún, in 2003’ (Husar, 10; 2016). Such successes nurture 
the image of IBSA as the leader of the South. One important point in the Brasilia Declaration 
was the reform of the UN Security Council. Pushing for reform trilaterally has been difficult 
however, because of internal competition amongst African Union member states and the 
reluctance of other developing countries to support IBSA in taking a leading role in the UNSC. 
Ultimately, reform was vetoed by the Security Council, but IBSA did manage to secure a 
temporary seat from 2011-2012. Lastly, the IBSA states have taken a joint stance in the issue 
surrounding the Middle-East, especially Palestine. The foreign ministers met with the prime 
minister of Palestine on the side-lines of the 2010 IBSA summit in Brasilia and issued a joint 
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declaration on the situation in the Middle-East, which was followed up by annual declarations 
of IBSA foreign ministers (Husar, 10-12; 2016). Another important achievement was 
established in March 2004. The IBSA Facility for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger (the 
IBSA Fund) became operational in 2006 and offers developmental aid to projects in the poorest 
of countries. Another important achievement for the IBSA dialogue forum is political in nature.  
The forum has established working groups, signed co-operation agreements, fostered 
collaboration on research issues of common interest and helped to build business partnerships 
Mokoena, 131; 2007). In total, 16 working groups4 have been established in order to explore 
the potential of coordination between ministries. The work groups have resulted in several 
memoranda of understandings (MoU) (Husar, 12; 2016). Besides the working groups there are 
seven people-to-people fora5 ‘which reflect the interest of the three Member States in 
improving interaction and relations between Government and grass-root levels so that IBSA is 
not only restricted to Government efforts’ (IBSA). Other, more tangible, outcomes of the IBSA 
initiative include the IBSA nanotechnology initiative, the IBSA Virtual Centre and joint naval 
exercises under IBSAMAR.  
 
BRICS 
In 2001, Jim O’Neill coined the acronym BRICs (note the small ‘s’) in a paper discussing the 
world economic situation regarding large developing countries Brazil, Russia, India and China 
(3). At that point, there was no intention of creating a multilateral alliance born out of the need 
for reform and management of international financial systems (Sakar, 128; 2014). However, 
the acronym got traction in economics and, later on, in International relations. In 2011, with 
the inclusion of South Africa, the small ‘s’ was replaced with a large S and the BRICs became 
BRICS. The casus O’Neill brought to the attention of economists everywhere was indeed a 
very interesting one. The four countries had experienced rapid economic growth during the 
1990s which gathered momentum in the early 2000s. Many multinational companies would 
implement BRICs business strategies and business schools around the world would launch 
courses set up around the BRICs idea (Liu, 443; 2016).  
 In 2006 political dialogue within the BRICS format started to take shape. The foreign 
ministers met at the Sixty-First UN General Assembly and initiated a regular informal 
                                                          
4 Agriculture; Culture; Defence; Education; Energy; Environment; Health; Human Settlements; Public 
administration ;Revenue Administrations; Science and Technology; Information Society; Social Development; 
Trade and Investment; Tourism; Transport and Infrastructure. 
5 Academic Forum; Business forum; Tri-Nation summit on small business; Editor’s forum; Local Governance 
forum; Parliamentary forum; Women’s forum. 
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diplomatic coordination, with annual meetings of Foreign Ministers at the margins of the 
General Debate of the UN General Assembly (Liu, 444; 2016). In June 2008 the four BRICs 
leaders had short meeting at the G-8 summit in Japan where they decided to organise the first 
full-scale summit the next year. In the meantime, BRICs was routinely described as an 
‘informal group’ and the countries held a 15 percent share of the world economy (Stuenkel, 3; 
2014). The first BRICs summit was held in Yekaterinburg on 16 June 2009. It was in the wake 
of the 2008 global financial crisis which had all the major Western powers in deep economic 
recession. The global South was able to avoid the financial crisis, which had somewhat eroded 
the triumph of capitalism in the Western world. This in turn allowed for the developing 
countries to step up and shift the balance of power toward them (Nayyar, 582; 2016).  
 The third summit introduced South Africa to the alliance creating the BRICS acronym. 
The economic and physical size of Brazil, China and India explains their inclusion and Russia, 
a former superpower, was strategically situated in Europe. The inclusion of South Africa, rather 
than for example Indonesia, marked the inclusion of the African continent to the alliance 
(Ibid.). The diversity of the alliance also comes with a downside. The BRICS countries are 
marked by their diversity which creates difficulties in creating a common vision on global 
affairs. There is next to no geographical proximity, their economic size and position in the 
global production chain vary widely and their values regarding political structures and 
geopolitical interests are diametrically different (Liu, 446; 2016). Furthermore, there are 
serious geopolitical conflicts amongst the BRICS, seeing as India and China are considered 
strategic rivals. Not only economically, but also security wise. India has expanded military 
cooperation to countries in the West pacific and Indian Ocean in order to balance against 
Beijing. In turn, China has balanced against New Delhi by allying with Islamabad. On other 
points, such as the UN reform, the BRICS share different viewpoints too. The IBSA members 
have taken up Japan to issue a security council reform which has been opposed by China 
because inclusion of Japan in the security council would seriously impede Chinese influence 
in East Asia. 
Despite, and to some extend due, to these structural problems, after several years of 
talks at different levels, all four members realised that without deepening coordination 
collective positions vis-à-vis the developed countries concerning global financial issues could 
not be reached. This new focus led to the creation of new ministerial meetings within the 
BRICS association (Liu, 445; 2016). These meetings range from agriculture to science, 
technology and innovation. The BRICS summits have been focused around commitments. 
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After each of the summits the member states issue a joint communiqué, often with a list of 
commitments to which each country will comply.  
 
Table 1      Source: Table 4: BRICS Compliance Scores, 2011-2015 
From 2011-2015 the BRICS research group6 has analysed the compliance performance by the 
BRICS countries7. The outcome of their analyses is listed in table 1. The analysis reveals that 
the BRICS countries complied well with the development, terrorism and macroeconomic 
policies commitments at the core of their agenda. Performance on regional security issues is 
uneven, with an overall average of 50%. It seems that despite the structural constraints on 
development, the BRICS countries are strongly dedicated to carrying out their tasks at hand. 
This dedication is also one of the underlying reasons for the creation of the New Development 
Bank (NDB). The NDB was established during the sixth BRICS summit in 2014 after the 
signing of an agreement by the BRICS leaders (NDB History). Both the BRICS and IBSA thus 
have a financial initiative focused on development. They are, however, not quite the same as 
the following case study will reveal. 
 
Two South-South development initiatives. 
 
The IBSA fund. 
In 2004 the IBSA leaders established the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty 
and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund). In 2006 the fund became operational with the purpose 
                                                          
6 Of the University of Toronto and the International Organizations Research Institute of the National Research 
University Higher School of Economics (IORI HSE).  
7 For the full analysis please see http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/compliance/index.html 
  Sanya 2011 Delhi 2012 Durban 2013 Fortaleza 2014 Ufa 2015
Trade 0.4 0 1 −1.00   0.1 55%
Development 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8  +0.40 0.56 78%
Macroeconomic policies     0.2   1 0.6 80%
Financial regulation 0.4     0.2 1 0.53 77%
Climate change 0.8 0.2       0.5 75%
International financial institution reform 0.2 0.2       0.2 60%
Energy   0.6       0.6 80%
Regional security     0.2 0.2 −0.40 0 50%
Terrorism     0.4 0.6 +0.80  0.6 80%
Environment       1   1 100%
Human rights       0.6  +0.20 0.4 70%
Crime and corruption       0.8   0.8 90%
Information and communications 
technology         0.8 0.8 90%
Food and agriculture         0.8 0.8 90%
0.48 0.28 0.48 0.4 0.56
74% 64% 74% 70% 78%
Average
Average 0.44 72%
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to ‘identify replicable and scalable projects that can be disseminated to interested developing 
countries as examples of best practices in the fight against poverty and hunger’ (UNDP IBSA 
report, 2015). The IBSA fund supports projects on a demand-driven basis through partnerships 
and interaction with local governments, national institutions and implementing partners. 
Projects can range from providing food security to combatting HIV/Aids and are all in the aim 
of contributing to the achievement of the millennium development goals (UNDP IBSA report, 
2015). The IBSA fund is more than providing financial aid to the poorest countries, it is also 
about knowledge sharing among Southern experts and institutions, capacity-building between 
beneficiaries and built-in project sustainability.  
The IBSA fund is administered by the UNOSSC and governed by a board of directors 
which comprises the Ambassadors of India, Brazil and South Africa to the United Nations in 
New York. In 2005, it was agreed upon that all three countries would make an annual 
contribution of US$ 1 million to the IBSA fund. Thus far, eleven projects have been finished, 
ranging from solid waste collection in Haiti to refurbishment of healthcare infrastructure in 
Cape Verde (IBSA Fund Project Portfolio). Another seven projects are ongoing, including a 
job creation project in Sudan and five more projects have been approved (as of 2015). So far, 
US$ 29 million has been contributed and over US$ 16 million has been implemented in 14 
different countries (UNDP IBSA report, 2015). The three IBSA leaders have committed a 
minimum of US$ 1 million each year to the fund and with each, new contributions are made.  
The IBSA fund is a South-South cooperation answer to the Western notion of 
development diplomacy. This Western notion of aid comprises a focuses on multilateral 
institutions which are provided by official agencies and promote the economic welfare of 
developing countries which have to be concessional in character (OECD). The Western form 
of development, however, is often conditional to neo-liberal and good governance precepts. 
This has resulted in developing governments being bound to Western developed external 
funders rather than able to rely on their own constituencies (Masters et al., 347; 2015). The 
economic crisis of 2008 allowed for emerging economies to step into the development 
cooperation game as traditional donors had developed budgetary constraints. This expansion 
has created an increased emphasis on the importance of development diplomacy. In this regard, 
the IBSA fund has made a valuable contribution, moving away from Western aims and 
practices toward a Southern defined way of providing development aid; this includes an 
emphasis on non-conditionality (Masters et al., 348; 2015). Engaging with local entities is 
another innovative measure taken by the IBSA fund in development aid. This creates an 
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environment in which it is possible to provide development aid without ‘conditionalities’ and 
takes away any perceptions of paternalism and imperialism.  
 
The NDB. 
The New Development Bank is ultimately the best evidence of the BRICS countries’ ability to 
realise substantive agreements. It also shows the commitment to emerge as a counterweight to 
the established western financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank. First signs of the creation of the NDB showed at the BRICS New Delhi 
Summit in 2012. In 2014 the leaders of the BRICS countries signed an agreement to establish 
the NDB and in 2015, in the wake of the seventh summit, the bank saw its ultimate realisation. 
The establishment of the NDB was to ensure institutionalisation of the BRICS alliance, but 
also as a reaction to the Western failure to invest in infrastructure deficits in developing 
countries (Qobo, 279; 2015). The Fortaleza Declaration emphasizes on these points: 
 
‘In the Fortaleza Declaration, the leaders stressed that the NDB will strengthen 
cooperation among BRICS and will supplement the efforts of multilateral and regional 
financial institutions for global development, thus contributing to collective 
commitments for achieving the goal of strong, sustainable and balanced growth’ (NDB 
History). 
 
With the creation of the NDB, the BRICS countries also had the task to create a financial safety 
net. Through the establishment of a contingent reserve arrangement (CRA) that, short-term 
liquidity pressures would be forestalled (Qobo, 280; 2015). The creation of these two 
institutions marks an increase in bargaining power for the BRICS countries in the international 
financial order. It is a way to increase their hard power through economic means. Through the 
NDB the BRICS can address concerns that directly affect them and their regions with respect 
to infrastructure gaps, reach out to other developing countries and emerging economies with a 
view to augment their bargaining capacity vis-à-vis Western powers and strengthen their 
agenda-setting capacity in multilateral processes, while also elaborating new rules and norms 
(Qobo, 281; 2015).  
 At its conception, the BRICS leaders subscribed to US$ 50 billion in capital to the NDB 
and authorized another US$ 100 billion to the CRA. As of now the NDB has seven projects 
running, all of which in one of the BRICS countries. Six out of the seven projects revolve 
around renewable energy and one, in Madhya Pradesh (India), is to upgrade major district 
roads. This is in accordance with the Fortaleza declaration and the overall NDB mission, which 
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focusses on sustainable development (NDB Mission). The NDB funds projects by issuing 
loans, the first loan was issued in 2016 for a US$75 million project in China.  
Despite many structural constraints which inhibit the BRICS from flourishing, the 
creation of the NDB has had a significant political impact and shifted global political influence 
more towards the Global South (Liu, 449; 2016). However, this does not mean that the BRICS 
do not have a lot of improvements to make. The economic prosperity which were the primary 
cause to bring together these countries have mostly disappeared, economically the BRICS 
countries are far worse off than 15 years ago. Besides growing gaps between the GDP’s of each 
BRICS country, the growth rates have been shrinking. Especially the economic performance 
of Brazil and Russia has been poor the past decade (O’Neill, 2016). Furthermore, BRICS tend 
to announce many meetings mechanisms, but seldom announce tangible policy measures and 
specific projects. Working groups do not yield effective results and in the event of major events 
in the international arena are not followed up by joint action.  
 
IBSA and BRICS are in many ways very similar. Both are South-South multilateral 
cooperating mechanism designed to represent developed countries in the Global South. For too 
long the Western political status quo has defined world politics, but globalisation has turned 
the tables. A newly formed middle class in the Global South is shifting the global political 
economy towards the south, but global politics are not (yet) following. These institutions have 
devoted their partnership to changing just that. The idea of creating a voice for the Global South 
is shared by both IBSA and the BRICS, the way to aim to achieve that, however, is different. 
IBSA is relying on the shared norms and values between the three member states. India, Brazil 
and South-Africa all face the same problems surrounding poverty, social inequality and the 
need for sustaining economic development. IBSA recognizes that they are not the only 
countries in the global south facing these problems and thus aims to help not only themselves, 
but also other developing countries, to get rid of these problems. This cannot be done by these 
three countries alone, since the problem at hand lies in the structure of the international system 
today. International hierarchy might not apply amongst global super powers, but in the global 
south many countries do find themselves in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the Global North 
(Escudé, 56; 2015). To change this, IBSA aims to use soft power strategies to attract power 
from the Global North through political coordination in International Institutions such as the 
United Nations and the WTO. The IBSA countries lend themselves better for soft power 
strategies since they have shared norms and values. Something which cannot, necessarily, be 
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said for the BRICS countries. The IBSA fund is a case in point, it is not set up to run a profit, 
but it is there to sincerely help developing countries. Its non-conditional nature is an example 
of that, but also the fact that projects are funded, rather than the money being lend to certain 
developers. This ‘constructive and hands-on approach to development is what makes [IBSA] 
different from previous examples of South–South dialogue. Such initiatives failed to deliver 
tangible results, due largely to an amorphous membership with diverse interests’ (le Pere et al., 
2008).  
 It is no secret that the BRICS countries do not share the same ideological views on 
certain important international matters. Both in geographical and economical size the BRICS 
countries diverge, but also in geopolitics. This has restrained them from taking a common 
standpoint on important issues, such as UN reform. Overall, the BRICS countries have upheld 
their commitments. Although not many concrete policies or coordinating rules have come out 
of these commitments, the BRICS have made a successful institution that will challenge the 
current Northern led system. The NDB is the Global South’s power house when it comes to 
providing an alternative for the current system. The BRICS countries are aware of their 
economic power and have now translated that into a development bank directly opposing the 
World Bank and WTO. This is a decidedly hard power strategy, as opposed to the soft power 
strategy which IBSA has taken on. The structure of the NDB is therefore completely different 
from the IBSA Fund. The NDB has to make a profit in order to increase its capital and with it 
increase its lending capacity (Griffiths-Jones, 3; 2015). In the same light, the NDB has already 
issued US$ 435.5 million in bonds on the Chinese market and plans to extend this to up to US$ 
500 million in bonds (Kumar et al., 2017).  
 Both South-South alliances have taken the idea of financial assistance in development 
and produced an institution which provides just that. However, IBSA has chosen for a soft 
power approach and BRICS has chosen a hard power approach. Nevertheless, the goal for both 
IBSA and BRICS is to increase the voice of the global South. In that sense, both of these 
approaches are working. Where IBSA lacks in hard power, BRICS makes up for that and vice 
versa. These two development programs are thus not mutually exclusive; in fact they 
complement each other.  
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Chapter 4 - Orchestration in practice. 
 
India, Brazil and South Africa rely on soft power to reach their desired goals. They do so, 
because they do not enjoy the hard power that traditionally has ruled the landscape of global 
politics. Although IBSA is cooperating in defence matters, it does not come close to great 
powers such as the United States, the EU or China. On an economic note, IBSA cannot afford 
to use hard power economic strategy, since all three countries rely too heavily on export; which 
has been reaffirmed by the recent financial crisis in Brazil (ECB bulletin; 2016). The lack of 
hard power resources is not a problem, however, since IBSA is, and always has been, successful 
in the soft power game. Within the soft power game there still are different directions to take. 
As chapter two explains soft power governance can be done through collaboration or 
orchestration. This thesis focuses on the latter and therefore it comes as no surprise that IBSA 
uses the orchestration in its soft power approach. This chapter will look more closely in which 
fields IBSA already uses orchestration and in which fields it might use orchestration in the 
future. First, the IBSA fund and the G20+8  will be looked at as examples of how IBSA uses 
orchestration theory. Second, one of the main goals of the IBSA dialogue forum, namely reform 
of the UN, will be set in an orchestration light. How might orchestration be useful in achieving 
UN reform? Finally, concluding remarks will be given on the use of orchestration by IBSA and 
how this ultimately supports the change in global influence towards the Global South.  
 
The IBSA fund and Orchestration. 
 
Orchestration requires three ingredients: 1) orchestrator, 2) intermediary, 3) target agent. 
Abbott et al. (2015) have put these in a clear overview: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 The G20+ here refers to the Group of 20 developing nations formed at the WTO Cancún ministerial 
conference in 2003. The G20+ is also referred to as the G22, the G20 and the G20 developing nations. 
Figure 2      Indirect governance through orchestration 
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The orchestrator thus enlists an intermediary in order to govern a certain target. This indirect 
way is used, because the orchestrator does not have the means to govern a target directly. For 
IOs this is often a problem, since governments are jealous of IOs interfering with their 
sovereignty. Orchestration, then, is a useful way to bypass a state. Orchestration, however is 
not limited to IOs alone. In our case orchestration is used by a multilateral institution.  
 The use of orchestration by IBSA becomes very clear when looking at the IBSA 
development fund. This fund has been called into life to fulfil one of the many goals IBSA set 
out in its Brasilia declaration: 
 
‘The Ministers highlighted the priority placed by the three governments on the 
promotion of social equity and inclusion, by implementing effective policies to fight 
hunger and poverty, to support family run farms, and to promote food security, health, 
social assistance, employment, education, human rights and environmental protection’ 
(Brasilia Declaration; 2003). 
 
Declaring is, however, easier than implementing. Carrying out projects to combat social 
inequality and exclusion across borders is extremely difficult, especially for a multilateral 
institution. In this, IBSA faces the same challenges as IOs, since implementing development 
projects cannot be done without interference in a state that is not your own. The IBSA fund has 
projects in 13 different states, all of which use orchestration as a form of governance.  
 Orchestration in the IBSA fund can be broken down as follows: 1) the orchestrator is 
IBSA, 2) the intermediaries are the UNOSSC, local ministries, villages and sub-governmental 
departments and 3) the targets are the recipients of the IBSA fund projects (ranging from 
farmers to urban youth). IBSA itself cannot intervene in the states where IBSA fund projects 
are carried out. It neither has the required networks nor logistical assets to organise such 
projects. What it does have is financial support for the projects that are granted financial support 
by the board of directors. With the financial support, the IBSA fund calls upon the UNOSSC 
to administer the fund, since the UNOSSC has vast experience in organizing development 
projects and has offices in most of the countries that qualify for IBSA fund initiatives. 
Furthermore, the UNOSSC contains a large network which it can use when setting up and 
arranging a local project.  
 In this, the UNOSSC works closely together with local ministries and sub-state 
departments such as departments of provinces and local businesses. In that sense, the 
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intermediary enlists other parties to carry out the projects. This constitutes a form of 
collaboration: the UNOSSC collaborates with local authorities because these local authorities 
are cooperating voluntarily. The latter is important, because if participation would not have 
been voluntary, the UNOSSC would be delegating its tasks to local authorities. This, however, 
is not the purpose of the IBSA fund, which focusses on ‘capacity-building among project 
beneficiaries, built-in project sustainability, and knowledge-sharing among Southern experts 
and institutions’ (IBSA Report 2015) within its projects. Ultimately, the projects reach the 
target agents, which are the ‘poor and hungry’ which the IBSA fund is dedicated to alleviate. 
The IBSA dialogue forum thus uses an NGO as an intermediary to reach their target agents and 
provides financial support as well as endorsement and administrative support to steer the 
intermediary in the right direction.  
 
The G20+, IBSA and orchestration. 
 
From 10 to 14 September 2003 the fifth biannual WTO ministerial conference was held in 
Cancún Mexico. Some weeks before the ministerial conference the EU-US issued a joint 
document on agriculture. The EU-US document, however, blindsided developing countries in 
international agricultural trade. According to Celso Amorim, then foreign minister of Brazil: 
‘The real dilemma that many of us had to face was whether it was sensible to accept an 
agreement that would essentially consolidate the policies of the two subsidizing 
superpowers – with very modest gains and even some steps backward (the new broader 
definition of ‘blue box’ subsidies to accommodate the US for instance) – and then have 
to wait for another 15 or 18 years to launch a new round, after having spent precious 
bargaining chips’ (Narlikar et al., 951; 2004). 
 
The document the EU-US proposed was unsatisfactory to say the least and the IBSA countries 
took it upon themselves to provide a political alternative to what was perceived as a new Blair 
House Agreement, excluding the interests of developing countries (Veiga, 2005). The G20+ 
‘was not born in Cancún or in Geneva, during the weeks preceding the WTO Ministerial 
Conference. It emerged from the political trust built up between Brazil, India and South Africa 
some months earlier’ (Ibid.). Knowing that a document proposed by the three countries alone 
would not survive the ministerial conference, the IBSA countries used orchestration to reach 
their target. In this case, 1) the IBSA countries are the orchestrater, 2) the G20+ is the 
intermediary and 3) reform of international agriculture policy is the target.  
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 The IBSA states used their convening power to create a new coalition at the Cancún 
ministerial. Brazil and India drafted the first text together and then sought alliances with other 
developing countries participating in the ministerial to form the G20+. At the Cancún 
ministerial there were more groups than just the G20+, which made it especially difficult to 
align the developing nations to form a coordinated effort at presenting a proactive agenda. 
Ultimately, the G20+ did incorporate members from different groups to put forth an alternative 
to the EU-US document on agriculture. This highlights the importance of agenda setting and 
coordination in orchestration. By setting an agenda to provide an alternative to the EU-US 
document, the IBSA states were able to gather support from other developing countries despite 
different views on agricultural policy. The IBSA agenda provided cognitive and normative 
guidance. Furthermore, coordinating efforts between the members of the G20+ resulted in a 
stronger pact against the EU-US. This was necessary, because the build-up of the G20+ was a 
very unlikely one, combining Cairns Group exporters and defensive food importers, some of 
the largest countries in the developing world and some of the smallest. Theoretically, the G20+ 
was doomed to fail (Narlikar, 953-954; 2004). It did not, however, and is still active in the 
Doha Round negotiations, pursuing ambitious reforms of agriculture in developed countries 
with some flexibility for developing countries (WTO).  
 
Using orchestration to create a bigger voice for the Global South. 
 
Ultimately, both the IBSA fund and the G20+ stand in service of the greater goal IBSA aims 
to achieve, a greater voice for the developing countries in the Global South. Applying 
orchestration theory to that goal is different from applying the same theory to any given 
international organisation. The target agents in the case of the IBSA fund are not the traditional 
targets seen in orchestration theory. This is a result of the nature of IBSA itself, it is not an 
International Organisation but rather an International Institution. As has been established in the 
previous chapters, IBSA must rely on soft power to achieve its goal and in that sense, 
orchestration theory is very suitable to just that. Applying orchestration theory to IBSAs goal 
of gaining more soft power, the following division of the model proposed by Abbott et al. is at 
hand: 1) the orchestrater is IBSA, 2) the intermediaries are the projects IBSA carries out besides 
UNSC reform and 3) the targets are the member states of the UN general assembly and in 
particular the UNSC. 
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For IBSA, the most likely way to achieve their goal of greater equality in global politics is 
through reform of the UN, especially reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
Reform is therefore one major part of the Brasilia Declaration, which states: 
 
‘They [the IBSA leaders] stressed the necessity of expanding the Security Council in 
both permanent and non-permanent member categories, with the participation of 
developing countries in both categories. They agreed to combine efforts in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations’ (Brasilia Declaration, 2003). 
 
Participation of developing countries in the UNSC is key to creating a shift in world politics. 
UN reform, however, is difficult to achieve and it will take a long time to reach consensus in 
the General Assembly. The need for reform, however, is natural to an institution such as the 
United Nations and has been a topic of discussion since its foundation in 1945. The fact 
remains, however, that despite a general agreement on the need to reform the council, there is 
also a general disagreement on how to reform the council. This makes the topic divisive and 
contentious and its continued failure highlights the growing division within the General 
Assembly. Logically, then, what is needed is greater agreement on the way the UNSC must be 
reformed. IBSA can play an important role in this process, since it positions itself as 
representative of the global south and has proven to be successful in bringing together diverse 
groups of countries.  
 In 2007 the IBSA member states made an attempt at reform with a draft resolution 
dubbed ‘L69’ which was signed by 25 member states. The draft was produced by India and co-
sponsored by Brazil, South-Africa and Nigeria. ‘The move by the IBSA-countries was by any 
standard highly extraordinary as it suddenly presented the Working Group with the possibility 
of employing a vote, rather than their usual consensus method of working’ (Swart et al., 15; 
2013). Ultimately, the draft resolution was not called to a vote, but rather an amended draft 
report by the chairman reached a general consensus. The proposal by the IBSA states did ‘stir 
the pot’ and was aimed at triggering other states to come forward with their own draft 
proposals, so that different views could be discussed. The amended report by the chairman 
included the words ‘intergovernmental negotiations’ which was perceived as move toward 
actual negotiations on a concrete text (Swart et al., 16; 2013). In the fall of 2007 the three states 
reaffirmed their dedication to UNSC reform in a statement: ‘They [India, Brazil, and South 
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Africa] expressed their full support for a genuine reform and expansion of the Security Council, 
in permanent and non-permanent categories of membership, with greater representation for 
developing countries in both. […] They agreed to further strengthen cooperation amongst their 
countries and with other Member States interested in a genuine reform of the Security Council’ 
(Centre for UN Reform).  
In 2012 the sponsors of the original L69 presented a new draft resolution representing 
the continuing effort by IBSA to reform the UNSC. However, as much as orchestration has 
been helpful to IBSA in many of the issues pointed out in the Brasilia declaration of 2003, 
when it comes to UNSC reform, orchestration theory is not the way to go. It is ineffective and 
undiplomatic to issue an intermediary to negotiate in the UN on your behalf. This does not 
mean that orchestration cannot be helpful. In the United Nations consensus is the main tool for 
decision making. This means that the general assembly wholeheartedly agrees on a draft 
resolution and therefore does not need to vote in order to pass that draft resolution. This is 
especially important when a draft is not legally binding because then consensus will encourage 
member states to implement recommendations from a draft resolution voluntarily. Reaching 
consensus is equally important in reforming the UNSC. ‘The veto power of the P5  is one of 
the biggest obstacles to the reform of the Security Council. Any fundamental reform, such as 
any changes to the number of the Security Council seats, has to be inscribed into the Charter. 
On the other hand, Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter give veto power to the P5 over any 
amendment to the Charter. Therefore, no reform can materialise without the consent of the 
permanent members’ (Okhovat, 42-43; 2011).  
In order to reform the UNSC, then, IBSA must set out on a diplomatic mission to reach 
a consensus on the draft resolution they proposed. Effectively, this means increasing soft power 
to gain a better bargaining position at intergovernmental negotiations. Building a large enough 
negotiating ‘bloc’ is necessary to reach the best possible position in intergovernmental 
negotiations and ‘allow nations to build on a position of strength in numbers’ (Sidhu, 30; 2007). 
Imperative to this strategy is to continue to carry out a leading role in all fields related to the 
UN. Therefore, the projects IBSA initiates besides UNSC reform can be seen as intermediaries. 
Projects like the G20+ and the IBSA fund are used as intermediaries to reach consensus with 
other UN member states. By funding development projects in Africa, those countries are prone 
to vote in line with IBSA when asked to do so. Member states in the G20+ have worked 
together on reform of agricultural policy and are more likely to agree on UNSC reform because 
Orchestration in International Governance: the case of the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum. 
 
37 
 
of their shared history. Orchestration is thus not used to reach the ultimate goal of UNSC 
reform, but rather to create the means to reach the desired end.  
Ultimately IBSA can gain a lot from orchestration theory. If not directly, then indirectly. In the 
development field IBSA already uses orchestration effectively by using the UNOSSC and local 
governments as intermediaries. In reforming global financial institutions, IBSA uses the G20+ 
as an intermediary and still participates actively in the Doha round of negotiations. When it 
comes to reforming the United Nations Security Council, orchestration takes on a roll 
backstage. Since within the United Nations negotiating can, ultimately, inly be done by states 
themselves. However, in the United Nations it is of vital importance to hold enough cards to 
play in intergovernmental negotiations. In acquiring these cards, orchestration plays an 
important role. Orchestration is what makes projects such as the IBSA fund work and it is those 
projects which build towards a greater ‘bloc’ of power.  
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Conclusion. 
 
Since 2003 IBSA has shown the world that the Global South is not sitting still and will fight 
for more equality in global politics. It has shown that there is more to the Global South than 
the Western hegemons might think. Three different countries from three different continents 
have taken the task to represent the developing countries of the Global South, which have 
grown more important in light of global developments. In 2008 the financial crisis drew 
attention away from the west, which was deeply affected by the crisis, towards the Global 
South which was able to largely avoid the crisis and develop a substantial middle class. With 
growing economic importance IBSA became more relevant than ever through active 
engagement in the Doha development round by preventing the reinforcement of Northern 
capacity to extract concessions from the weaker states in the Global South. With IBSA there 
are several other Southern initiatives by developing countries which creates doubt among some 
authors on whether IBSA remains relevant or not. Especially the BRICS forum is one of the 
main competitors to IBSA, not least because all three member states are also in the BRICS 
initiative. This thesis has shown, however, that there are important differences between the two 
dialogue forums. BRICS uses hard power as their main strategy in global governance, whereas 
IBSA uses soft power. Both are dedicated to closing the North-South divide and both groupings 
are complementing each other through taking different approaches. 
 The soft power approach IBSA uses is largely built on methods of orchestration. The 
main theory this thesis focused on was orchestration theory as developed by Abbott et al.. 
Governance through the use of intermediaries is indirect and soft in nature. Indirect, because a 
third party is used to reach the target agent. Soft, because the intermediary voluntarily works 
with the orchestrater to govern the target. For IBSA this is an especially important form of 
governance, since for an international institution it is often difficult to govern targets in the 
sovereignty of member states. Through the IBSA fund and the G20 IBSA has used 
orchestration to govern a specific target. In development projects supported by the IBSA fund, 
intermediaries such as the UNOSSC and local ministries and government bodies, IBSA is able 
to govern the recipients of IBSA fund projects (i.e. the targets). Furthermore, through the G20 
IBSA used its convening power in order to bring together a group of countries that no scholar 
thought would stick together. In setting their own agenda IBSA were able to start a coalition 
which fought off the EU-US document on agriculture, which would have been devastating for 
developing countries in the Global South. 
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 These orchestration techniques are used to implement statements made in the Brasilia 
Declaration of 2003. They have, however, another purpose, namely increasing the soft power 
status enjoyed by IBSA. Ultimately, IBSA aims to increase the influence of the Global South 
in international politics. This means increasing influence in global political institutions, such 
as the WTO and the UNSC. The latter is in need of reform before the IBSA countries can gain 
more influence in the institution. IBSA does not enjoy hard power, they do not have the defence 
capabilities nor the economic capabilities. Therefore, IBSA has to rely on soft power 
techniques to create consensus amongst the UN general assembly members and, most 
importantly, the P5. Through the use of orchestration in the fields of development aid and 
international economic reform the soft power of IBSA increases and with it their chances of 
successful UN reform. IBSA is thus using orchestration theory to divert attention away from 
the Global North. However, generating change in International Politics remains a long term 
project. IBSA is working hard to create that change and reform at the UN cannot be ignored 
by the P5 forever. When the time comes, IBSA will stand ready to propose their draft resolution 
and with soft power strategy they will be able to create a greater voice for the Global South. 
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